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INDIA‟S ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
Srividhya Ragavan
I. Introduction
For developing countries, the concept of diversity holds great
promises not least because of the protection it promises for the fast
depleting natural resources leading to catastrophic effect on the
environment. The concept of diversity also holds great promises from a
trade perspective. In reality, appropriate protection of diversity can be the
solution to balance the effects of the trade regime to achieve sustainable
development. The term sustainable development, as opposed to rapid
pockets of development, embodies great promises for the socio-political
framework in poorer nations, apart from the obvious benefit of
sustainability. In fact, sustainable development, if it ensues, would complete
the trade regime‘s agenda by supplying the missing piece of the puzzle.
From a practical standpoint, at the very basic level, sustainable development
promises a level of inclusiveness, which can facilitate addressing broader
national issues.
Similarly, sustainable development is compatible with the larger
trade agenda by promising to include newer forms of trading capital – such
as biodiversity for biotechnology or traditional knowledge for
pharmaceutical innovation - hitherto excluded from the trade regime. The
trade regime which traditionally deals with what is typically western
properties like goods, services, patents and investments, can, in turn,
benefit from the dynamism resulting from say, trade in biodiversity and
traditional knowledge. This paper will discuss the issues that impact
biodiversity protection as a result of its interaction with the trade regime.
Particularly, this paper will focus on India and the issues it faces from
embracing the biodiversity and the trade regime.
II. Convention on Biological Diversity
Much has been written about the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Hence, after providing a short introduction to the Convention,
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this essay will concentrate on aspects of Convention that are important for
developing countries to embrace, not just in principle but in practice.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), signed at the
United Nation‘s Conference on Environment and Development in 1992,
came into force on December 29, 1993 1 with the primary agenda of
creating an international framework to beneficially exploit and conserve
biodiversity.2At the time of its conception, the Convention on Biological
Diversity was meant to complement the UN‘s efforts in establishing a
Conference on Environment and Development (hereinafter ―Rio
Summit‖), which addressed broadly the role of environment, climate, and
indigenous communities.3 The CBD was conceived as a global agreement
to address all aspects of biological diversity.4
Broadly, the CBD streamlined the use of access and sharing of
genetic resources to achieve three important objectives: first, conserving
biological diversity; second, promoting appropriate access for the
sustainable use of biodiversity components; and third, sharing benefits
from biodiversity resources in exchange for transfer of technology. 5 The
objectives of the Convention are set in the background of the principle of
―fair and equitable sharing‖ of the benefits from genetic resources, which
principle is considered the crux for enabling transfer of technology. 6
Overall, the CBD‘s objective is to promote the use of biodiversity resources
toward sustainable development. The term biologicaldiversity encompasses
plants, animals, and microorganisms and their relationship to the overall
ecosystems, including the people on earth and the genetic resource in the
ecosystem. 7 The CBD‘s distinguishing feature is its ability to serve as a
1
2
3

4
5
6
7

Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. Biodiv.No.92-7807, 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter ―CBD‖], also available at http://www.biodiv.org.
Id.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declarationon
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 87 (1992) [hereinafter ―Rio Declaration‖], Chapter 26, Agenda 21;see also
CBD, supra note 1.
Sustaining Life on Earth: How the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and
Human Well-Being (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/
publications/guide.asp?id=action.
CBD, supra note 1, Art. 1.
Id.
Id.
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conduit to enable sustainability and thus, it signifies a relative break from
the compulsive and one-dimensional developmental perspectives promoted
by the trade and intellectual property (IP) agenda.8
With the above as the background, the following narrative
highlights how the objectives are reflected in the Convention.
2.1 CONSERVATION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
Conservation remains the central objectives of the CBD – the main
emphasis is to prevent the loss of biodiversity due to bioprospecting and to
ensure sustainable use of the diversity materials, each of which is discussed
below.
Conservation & Sustainable Use: Conservation is the central tenet
around which the CBD is structured. That conservation is uniformly
important for all countries that seem to lose biodiversity materials due to
lack of adequate programs to conserve existing resources is not lost on the
Convention. Consequently, with the objective of furthering the idea of
conserving biodiversity materials, Article 8(g) of the CBD,9 discusses in situ
conservation and mandates that countries manage risks that are likely to
adversely impact the environment.10 That is, countries should ―[e]stablish or
maintain the means to regulate, manage or control risks from
biotechnology likely to adversely impact the environment.‖11
Tied closely with the concept of conservation is the requirement of
sustainable use of biodiversity materials. The underlying objective is that
conservation does not take away the right to use biodiversity. Nevertheless,
such use should not result in depletion of the biodiversity materials. Thus,
Article 3 of the CBD affirms the sovereign right of states to exploit
resources ―pursuant to their own environmental policies.‖ 12 It allows
governments to take stock of the biological diversity materials and
determine the best mechanism to ensure that it is not depleted. Article

8
9
10
11
12

Id.
Id.
Id., Art.8(g).
Id., Art.8(g).
Id., Art. 3.
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15(1) reflects this sentiment by emphasizing the ―sovereign rights of States
over their natural resources.‖13
However, although governments may impose restrictions on access
to genetic resources using national legislation, arguably the Convention
skews towards allowing access. For instance, Article 15(2) specifies that
national legislation shall not run counter to the objectives of the
Convention.14 One of the objectives of the Convention, outlined in Article
1, is to allow ―appropriate‖ access to genetic resources.15 In effect, Articles
15(1) and (2), when read in conjunction with Article 1, advocate
appropriate restrictions in a manner not stifling access to genetic resources.
In all, under the CBD, member states‘ have rights to limit and dictate the
manner and mechanism of allowing access. The Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, a Commission that means to integrate IP rights and
developmental policies, reflects this sentiment and notes that:
. . . care will be necessary to ensure that legislation and practices that seek to
give effect to the CBD do not in fact unnecessarily restrict or discourage the
legitimate use of genetic resources, whether with a view to commercialization or
in terms of scientific research. There is some evidence that the tightening of
restrictions in some countries has hindered the access of biologists studying
genetic resources.16
Importantly, while the CBD‘s legislative objective is to preserve
sovereign rights over genetic resources, the criticism remains that
operationally those rights are limited by the overall objective of granting
access to genetic resources. However, it is important to recognize that
development by definition will result in some use of biological diversity.
Perhaps, it is in recognition of this that the Convention has attempted to
balance use with sustainability. Consequently, countries cannot refuse
access but they can carefully impose restrictions to ensure preservation of
biodiversity and local communities. Such restrictions can include a
mandatory obligation to disclose what is accessed, consent of the
13
14
15
16

Id. Art.15(1).
Id. Art.15 (1) and (2).
Id., Art. 1.
Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating IP Rights &
Development Policy, 83–84, September (2002) [hereinafter ―CIPR Report‖], available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm.
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indigenous people, disclosure of terms with the indigenous people,
limitation of area that can be used for prospecting, restrictions over use of
area, and other such obligations.
The Nagoya Protocol 17 has further elaborated on the sovereign
rights over the resources as well as the competing interests in generating fair
and equitable sharing by emphasizing in Article 3 that each signatory party
can take appropriate measures to ensure benefit sharing and utilization of
traditional knowledge resources. Importantly, Article 3(4) of the Protocol
alludes to monetary as well as non-monetary benefits that countries can
negotiate as part of the deal. Some of these can be used to work around
impediments imposed by the TRIPS agreement.18 That is, Annex 2 outlines
several mechanisms whereby the holder of the genetic resources can
collaborate and work with the bioprospector. It provides for non-monetary
benefits including agreements that resemble local manufacturing
requirements (in exchange for transfer of diversity assets). When IP assets
are involved, countries should carefully tailor them to ensure that they fall
within the flexibilities outlined under the TRIPS agreement.
2.2 APPROPRIATE ACCESS TO BIODIVERSITY MATERIALS
One of the foremost objectives of the CBD is to preserve sovereign
rights over genetic resources. However, granting access to genetic resources
remains an equally important aspect of the Convention. The effect of this is
that while countries cannot refuse access, they can carefully impose
restrictions to ensure preservation of biodiversity and local communities.
Such restrictions can include a mandatory obligation to disclose what is
accessed, consent of the indigenous people, disclosure of terms with the
indigenous people, limitation of area that can be used for prospecting,
restrictions over use of area, and other such obligations. One such
important formality to access genetic resources is to obtain the ―prior
17 Article 6, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 2010),
available at http://www.cbd.int (last visited July 12, 2011).
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], reprinted in World Trade Organization,
The Results Of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 365 (1995),
[hereinafter, TRIPS].
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informed consent‖ of the holder. Articles 8(j) and 15(5) treat the
community consent requirement as a precondition to accessing biodiversity
assets.19 But, the CBD does not define the term ―prior informed consent.‖
Although the lack of definition allows countries to determine the type,
extent, and nature of information required to provide consent, it also leaves
a lot of scope for misuse. For instance, generally, in order for consent to be
informed, resource holders should have adequate knowledge of the proposed
use and future financial potential of the resources they would be sharing.
Such information is a prerequisite for the ad idem required to create a proper
―mutual agreement.‖ In practice, the degree of information to be imparted
tends to vary, depending on the bio–prospector, the holder, and the genetic
material in question. 20 This, however, provides an opportunity for
information to be withheld, depending on the level of awareness of the
indigenous people.
The potential for misuse is tremendous given the inequality in
bargaining capacity and sophistication of the parties. The nature of
information qualifying the consent as ―informed,‖ the constituents of
adequacy of the consent, and the time frame within which the information
should be shared are left to the member state to legislate upon depending
on the extent of education or knowledge of the community and such other
considerations. With a view to addressing this deficiency, the Bonn
Guidelines suggested measures that countries can adopt, such as
mechanisms that encourage disclosure of information to holders and
measures that prevent misuse of the genetic resources.21 Similarly, the more
recent Nagoya Protocol, discussed later in the paper, provides norms that
member states can adopt to ensure ―legal certainty, clarity and
transparency‖ in their domestic legislation. 22 The protocol suggests that
19 CBD, supra note 1, Art. 8(j) and 15(5).
20 See generally Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the
Relationship between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ELR 10625, 10631
(2001).
21 Article 16(d), Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilization, Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24 (Apr. 2002), available at
http:// www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=cop-06&d=24.
22 Article 6, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 2010),
available at http://www.cbd.int (last visited July 12, 2011).
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members establish rules to: (1) streamline access, (b) standardize the
process of obtaining prior informed consent, (3) create rules that can allow
decisions to be rendered in the event of a dispute, and (4) establish terms
relating to benefit sharing and use by third parties, including in relation to
intellectual property rights. 23 The Nagoya Protocol gives the impression
that related issues that may arise in this regard should be dealt with by
individual nations. 24 Article 7 of the Protocol provides: ―[I]n accordance
with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, with the
aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources
that is held by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the prior
and informed consent or approval‖ 25 Thus, the Protocol envisages or
guides member states to establish rules that provide for a streamlined
application procedure that establishes a fair, non-arbitrary mechanism
through a national authority and within a reasonable period of time. Such
procedure suggests not only a clear evidence of consent but also
notification to a national established clearing house of the consent to access
the information. Thus, a dispute settlement clause, a separate clause on
benefit sharing and intellectual property rights, including future assignment
or division of rights are all required to be part of the consent document.
The issue of prior informed consent has presented many challenges
to the member states. For instance, questions like whether the holders of
indigenous knowledge retain the right to refuse consent after knowing the
―full and fair‖ circumstances of the case remains unclear and unanswered.
Also, what happens in circumstances where an access agreement is violated
after the genetic resource has been transferred? The only possible remedy
under these circumstances is to invalidate the agreement for breach- but,
the question was whether that would violate the access commitment under
the CBD.26 Also, considering that the genetic material and knowledge have
already been transferred, invalidating the agreement is neither a deterrent to
the bioprospector nor a protective mechanism to indigenous societies. Post
the Nagoya Protocol, individual member have clearer guidelines to
determine these questions. They can fall within the larger ambit of ―terms
on changes of intent.‖27Alternately, some of these issues can also fall within
23
24
25
26
27

Id.
See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 21.
Id. Art. 7.
See CIPR Report, supra note 17, at 91.
Id.
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the scope of special considerations detailed under Article 8 of the Protocol
which provides adequate leeway for countries to take emergency, public
interest considerations including impact on food and agriculture. Article 10
encourages parties to determine modalities for equitable sharing of
resources in transboundary situations where it is impossible to obtain prior
informed consent.
Overall, the CBD seeks to empower countries to promote and
encourage conducive conditions that not only promote research to protect
biodiversity and thus, ensure sustainable development. The overarching
benefit of the Guidelines and the Protocolsare that they provide clear
options for member states to deal with such issues within their legal
structure. In all the CBD has made great progress, either directly or through
the protocols, to equip countries to seek specific returns to permit
prospecting. It is up to the member states to use local legislation to clearly
define and subject the access provision to proper consent of the
communities by outlining clear and standardized procedures.
a) Access to Technology: Access to biodiversity in exchange for
access to technology captures the essence of CBD‘s vision to promote
global equity.28 Thus, the issue of access and benefit sharing needs to be
positioned in the light of the CBD provisions for transfer of technology. 29
Article 1 of the CBD emphasizes the need for ―fair and equitable‖ sharing
of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.30 Similarly, Article
15, which discusses access to genetic resources, indicates the expectation of
transfer of technology31 whereas Article 16 details the access to technology
commitments. 32 By incorporating the philosophy of exchange of
technology and genetic resources, the CBD has raised the awareness level
of the value inherent in genetic resources. However, in light of the relatively
easy access to genetic resources, the flexibility in the narrative of the CBD
has resulted in the issues discussed below.

28 Chen, supra note 19, at 10659.
29 See Srividhya Ragavan, The Global South as the Key to Biodiversity and Biotechnology—A
Reply to Professor Chen, 32 Envir. L. Rep. 10358, 10359–61 (2001).
30 CBD, supra note 1, art. 1.
31 Id. Art. 15.
32 Id. Art. 16.
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First, the CBD narrative, although encouraging developing
countries to provide access to genetic resources, repeatedly conditions
transfer of technology commitments on mutual agreement of the parties. The
emphasis on mutual agreement subjects transfer of technology obligations
to the bargaining skills of the parties.33 For instance, Article 15(4) specifies
the expectation for benefit sharing between the providers and users of
genetic material, but adds that ―such sharing shall be made on mutually
agreed terms.‖34 Similarly, Article 16(2) specifies the transfer of technology
will occur ―preferentially‖ under ―fair and most favorable terms.‖ 35 The
CBD does not define the terms ―fair and most favorable‖ or ―preferential,‖
presumably to allow nations to effectively define them. 36 The article
operates on the assumption that ―preferential terms‖ for transfer of
technology will be negotiated or facilitated by members. Further, Article
16(3) requires that countries providing genetic material be ―provided access
to and transfer of [proprietary] technology . . . on mutually agreed terms.‖ 37
Thus, the obligations of transferring technology remains dependent on the
bargaining powers of parties, which skews the balance against nations with
less bargaining parity. In practice, the relative bargaining power of the
parties makes it difficult to negotiate an equitable transfer of technology. In
some instances, the local communities that are involved may be unaware of
the extent of development or the realm of available technologies, options
or possibilities from the accessed materials. Developing or least-developed
countries can hardly be expected to bargain and negotiate a meaningful
technology transfer agreement under such circumstances. Perhaps, it is in
recognition of this impediment that the Nagoya Protocol outlines
mechanisms that can be used to improve bargaining exercise. For instance,
Article 22 discusses capacity building and encourages member states to
identify their national capacity needs and priorities through self-assessment.
Such an exercise could greatly enhance the negotiation by informing the
diversity holders of their needs and help them exploit their resources
towards adding value to existing resources.
Second, the benefit-sharing provision of the CBD does not obligate
developed nations to impose statutory transfer requirements in exchange
33
34
35
36
37

Id. Art.15(2) (highlighting that access is also subject to mutually agreed terms).
Id. Art.15(4).
Id. Art.16(2).
Id.
Id. Art.16(3).
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for benefits derived from genetic resources. For instance, Article 19 of the
CBD states that countries shall ―take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective participation in
biotechnological research activities.‖ 38 Article 19(2) stresses the need for
developing countries to participate in efforts to further research and
development.39 The local participation requirement is another form of the
local working requirement rendered as a barrier to trade under the TRIPS
agreement. Unlike clause 1, however, clause 2 operates only if the parties
arrive at ―mutually agreeable‖ terms.
Third, the CBD‘s contemplated objective is an exchange of genetic
and technological resources ―taking into account all rights over those
resources and to technologies.‖ The rights over biodiversity resources are
unclear because ownership remains unresolved. The government, one or
more indigenous societies (which need not be a cohesive group), or other
locals can all either share or retain specific rights of ownership.
Consequently, what amounts to effective protection of rights over
biodiversity resources—whether it is right to royalties, sharing IP rights, or
merely a requirement to grant ―prior informed consent‖—is left for
individual member states to determine. The Nagoya Protocol in the Annex
lists monetary and non-monetary benefits that can serve as a guidepost to
member countries.
The flexibility and the opportunity to create mutually beneficial
agreements offered by the CBD is a great asset. Recognizing that in
practice, there is a tendency to acquire as much of the genetic resources as
possible with minimal transfer of technology, the Nagoya Protocol has
attempted to address how the CBD‘s flexibilities can be best exploited. In
all, CBD provides a great opportunity for biodiversity-rich members to
statutorily structure access to technology requirements as a precondition for
appropriate access.
b) Access and IP Rights: The biggest criticism of the CBD is
perhaps its emphasis on accommodating IP rights that will interfere with
transfer of technology to the poorest regions of the world. For instance,
Article 16(2) of the CBD specifies that technology subject to IP rights shall
38 See id., Art. 19.
39 Id. Art.19(2) (mandating access to technology by developing countries ―on a fair and
equitable basis‖).
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be transferred ―on terms which recognize and are consistent with the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.‖ 40 In
practice, arguably there will be no access to technology under the CBD
unless IP is adequately protected and respected by an agreement defining
the contours of the technology.
Further, unlike rights over resources discussed earlier, the IP regime
clearly allocates rights over technologies. Consequently, the process of
granting access to biodiversity recourses while accounting for the ―rights
over the technology‖ results in positing IP rights ahead of rights over the
biodiversity resources. Ideally, access to genetic resources should be made
in exchange for a transfer of technology that leads toward sustainable
development ―notwithstanding intervening IP rights.‖ This way, indigenous
communities can, for instance, seek access to sophisticated technologies or
patented medications in return for access to genetic resources. Although
the language in Article 16 (5) highlights that IP rights should not run
counter to the working of the CBD, so far very few negotiations have
actually used Article 16(5) to ensure access by indigenous people to the
technologies. The Nagoya Protocol has attempted to address some of these
issues through their guidelines like laying out clear terms over ownership of
intellectual properties, joint ownership etc. Even though the success of
these terms unfortunately depends on bargaining parities, the increased
awareness has resulted in conscious efforts in several countries towards
protection of biodiversity assets. Similarly, many developing countries,
including India, have attempted to provide different types of protection to
prevent depletion of traditional knowledge assets.
III. India‟s Standing in the Diversity and Trade Complex
India‘s standing on biodiversity issues remains important on
account of several reasons. First, as one of the leaders of emerging
economies and a member of the BRIC group of nations, the steps that a
country like India takes to protect biodiversity becomes a trend setter to
other developing countries. Second, protection of environment and its
related assets is a Constitutional issue in India. 41 Third, India is a
documented mega-diversity country. The National Biodiversity Authority in
40 See CBD, supra note 1, Art. 16(2).
41 Constitution of India, (India) (1950), Directive Principles of State Policy, Part IV Art
48A.
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India accounts for 7-8% of the recorded species of the world with a
documented 45,968 species of plants and 91,364 species of animals. 42
Fourth, the country houses 4 of the 34 global biodiversity hotspots and is
recognized as a Vavilovian Center for diversity of crops. 43 These are the
geographic regions where crops exhibit maximum diversity in terms of
number of races and botanical varieties.44 Fifth, India also houses several
tribal and indigenous communities within the country and hence,
protection of their knowledge is important. Last, notwithstanding all of the
above, India‘s status as an emerging economy, its rate of real estate
development, the extent of corruption and the extent of pollution has
resulted in the depletion of biodiversity at alarming levels. Hence, efforts to
conserve biodiversity and develop sustainably are important paradigms of
India‘s development agenda.
India has taken steps to preserve its biological diversity and
associated assets. The following narrative examines some of these steps and
its adequacy to address the problems. The narrative below examines
whether these are adequate and if so, to what extent?
A. BIODIVERSITY ACT, 2002
India has embraced the mandate of conservation of biological
diversity, sustainable use of its components and fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the use of biological resources by enacting the
Biological Diversity Act, 2003. The statute‘s conduit to lead towards
conservation of biological diversity and sustainable use of its components is
to facilitate fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of
biological resources or traditional knowledge. Consequently, the enactment
establishes a National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) with powers to address
the broad objectives of the enactment. For instance, the scope of the
responsibilities of the NBA includes to ensure joint ownership with the
knowledge holders to facilitate transfer of technology and oversee research
and development activities with the local people. Among other things, the
NBA will also deal with issues of ―agro-biodiversity‖ which relates to
42 Policy Issues on Biodiversity (PPT), National Biodiversity Authority of India, Chennai
(2003) available at www.nba.nic.in
43 Id. Vavilovian Centers are areas around the world where most life originated from.
44 K. Venkatraman, India‘s Biodiversity Act 2002 and its Role in Conservation, Tropical
Ecology 50(1): 23-30, 2009.
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biological diversity of agriculture related species and their wild relatives.
Functionally, the NBA is required to streamline access to biological
resources by instituting an approval process. Thus, the concentration seems
to be to ensure that no biological resource is transferred out of India
especially by non-Indians (or non-resident Indians) or foreign corporations.
The extensive approval process creates an oversight except in the case of
institutional research which is exempted from the permission requirement
provided such research falls with the scope of the Central Government
policies. Importantly, any patent obtained using information relating to
biodiversity is subject to benefit sharing and other comparable conditions
like royalty sharing arrangements.
In terms of its structure, the NBA consists of a Chairperson and
three exofficio members one of whom will represent Ministry of Tribal
Affairs and the other two representing the Ministry of Environment and
Forests of whom one shall be the Additional Director General of Forests
or the Director General of Forests. Additionally, the Central Government
will also appoint seven other members (also termed as ex officio members)
representing different ministries including agriculture, biotechnology,
Ocean Development, Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy, etc.
These members will be guided by five non-official members who will serve
as specialists with special knowledge of biological diversity. The NBA will
also be assisted and advised by the State Biological Diversity Board (SDB)
which is similarly structured like the NBA. In turn, local bodies can have
biodiversity management committees which will oversee conservation and
sustainable use issues within the area.
B. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE BILL45
Amidst all of this, India is also attempting to legislate a Traditional
Knowledge Bill with the objective of protecting traditional knowledge and
―the rights of the traditional communities to practice, use, share and sell the
products of the use of traditional knowledge as per their customary
practice.‖ The Bill‘s objectives include ―sustainability of resources on which
the traditional knowledge are based, as well as to ensure the continuum of
the customary practices of the traditional knowledge.‖ This Bill also
establishes a governing mechanism – the Traditional Knowledge Board –
45 Draft Traditional Knowledge Bill, 2009, Circulated during the 2nd National
Consultation on IPR & TK, New Delhi, July 4th and 5th 2009.
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with zonal several offices. The more egregious portions of the Bill adds that
this office will receive applications for access to the traditional knowledge
in the prescribed format along with the details of the prior informed
consent, evaluate the impact on the environmental, conduct social impact
assessments, and oversee the traditional knowledge and resource
management plans submitted by the accesor. Further, before approving
access and license to use the traditional knowledge, the board will evaluate
to determine whether the bioprospecting will affect public order and
morality. Additionally, the Board will also facilitate the traditional
communities to negotiate the terms and conditions of benefit sharing upon
access to use the traditional knowledge.
C. INDIAN PATENT
KNOWLEDGE46

OFFICE

GUIDELINES

ON

TRADITIONAL

With a view to further bolster legislative and regulatory protection
in this area, the Indian patent office has also issued guidelines for the
processing of traditional knowledge related applications. The Guidelines
mandate examiners to include the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library
(TKDL) as part of its prior art search process and to ensure that any
material taken from the database is duly accounted for. Thus, the source of
the biological materials, a declaration as to whether that the material
originated from India or abroad and due permission from the competent
authority should all be appended with the application. In addition to all of
these, separate permission is required from the NBA in order for the
application to be prosecuted for patentability analysis. Under the
Guidelines, the following materials would be considered patent defeating:
a) Extracts/alkaloids and/or isolation of active ingredients of plants,
which are naturally/inherently present in plants,
b) Combination of one or more plants with same known-therapeutic
effect for treating the same disease would be treated as an obvious
combination (even if increased therapeutic efficacy is seen),
c) Use of an ingredient known for the treatment of a disease will
create a presumption of obviousness when any combination using
the same active ingredient is used, and
46 Guidelines for Processing of Patent Applications Relating to Traditional Knowledge
and Biological Material, Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and
Trademarks, India (2013) available at ipindia.nic.in.
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d) Isolation of a single component from multiple ingredients with
known to therapeutic activity (as per traditional knowledge).
Interestingly, that materials isolated from its natural state should not
patented is a point vigorously argued in the United States over the dispute
involving the Myriad gene patents issue that is currently being considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States.47

d. A NOTE ON INDIA‟S EFFORTS – WHAT A MESS!
In gist, the various legislative framework in India that caters to this
area of law seems over-lapping, unclear and poorly drafted. The good
intentions to provide protection for biodiversity materials have not fully
translated into appropriate legislative mechanisms. Instead, the over lapping
legislative efforts seemingly covers the same issues while leaving out gaping
loopholes.
The Biodiversity Act widely covers sustainable development. Yet,
the notion of ―sustainability of resources‖ is discussed under the
Traditional Knowledge Bill and reflects the same principles. Having two
legislations discuss the exact same components is confusing and
unnecessary. Further, each of these legislations establishes central and state
authorities to perform similar functions. In essence, areas where
communities practice traditional knowledge are also areas that are rich in
diversity. Hence, the oversight under the biodiversity statute should be
more than sufficient without the need for duplicative efforts under the
traditional knowledge legislation.
With respect to traditional knowledge, several of the documents in
India discuss ―protection.‖ And, many of the models that seem to be
discussed are styled akin to the intellectual property style of protection. It
seems lame that a country that objects to patent protection would jump
towards protection of traditional knowledge using intellectual property as a
framework. Importantly, one has to recognize the regulatory &
implementation costs associated in creating such an IP based model
47 Association of Molecular Pathology, et al, v. Myriad Genetics Inc, et al, No. 12-398
(On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
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reduces efficiency – thus, establishing such a model should be avoided at all
costs. Arguably, these efforts do not fully appreciate the important
differences between beneficially exploiting the resources versus creating a
protection regime for traditional knowledge. Mere protection regime does
not necessarily mean that there will be beneficial exploitation of resources
unless the plan for the latter is carefully delineated.
With respect to protection of traditional knowledge, there seems to
be no research or on-going study on the question of underlying differences
between the nature of the property in traditional knowledge and other
intellectual properties. Such understanding is critical to structuring a regime
to ensure protection for traditional knowledge by taking into account the
important differences with the intellectual property regime.
The over populated bureaucratic regimes that the biodiversity act
and the traditional knowledge bill together imposes will merely increase the
burdens which can impede realistic attempts to conserve biodiversity, or
protect traditional knowledge materials appropriately. The amount of public
money that would be required to fund and maintain these institutions will
eat into finances that should rightfully belong to the traditional
communities from benefit sharing. Further, the interaction of these two
bureaucracies with other government institutions will create more burden
and overly complicated mechanisms to deal with this area.
With respect to a patent, if a patent covers part of traditional
knowledge materials, it will be cleared by the National Biodiversity Board,
the authorities under the traditional knowledge statue (if passed) and will
also be subject to the oversight of the patent examiner. If India feels that
new discoveries in Ayurveda and Herbal medicines should be subjected to
patent protection, such overly burdensome procedures involving several
statutory authorizes is the best way to kill it.
The traditional knowledge bill provides for the authorities under the
enactment to conduct ―social impact assessments‖ and evaluate whether
the access of traditional knowledge affects public order, morality and the
environment.‖ It is unclear how these authorities, who are typically
administrative or service officers, will transform to perform the role of
arbiters or specialists of morality, environment impact studies and public
order all at the same time and without appropriate guidelines is unclear.
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Presumably, each of these are subjects require independent specialists to
evaluate the outcome appropriately.
In addition to all of the above, India has also enacted a Protection
of Plant Varieties and Farmer‘s Rights Act, 2001. 48 This enactment also
discusses benefit sharing and outlines a detailed set of statutory procedures
relating to benefit sharing. Interestingly, this enactment also creates an
extant variety typology which was introduced to protect traditional
knowledge and indigenous farmers.49 The extant variety register serves as a
compilation of matters known and existing in the public domain. In
essence, an extant variety encompasses a farmers‘ variety, or a variety about
which there is common knowledge, or a variety in the public domain and
any variety notified under section 5 of the Seeds Act.50
By making farmers‘ variety a subset of extant variety, the PPVFA
facilitates farmers to register varieties they have cultivated for years to
ensure that it cannot be appropriated. The most important benefit is that
registration or compilation of extant varieties creates a higher standard for
distinctness/non-obviousness for registering ―new‖ varieties. Thus, it
prevents protection of miniscule innovations by breeders. The interesting
aspect is that the Biodiversity Rules, 2004 mandates in Rule 22 that every
local body constitute the Biodiversity Management Committee (BMC). 51
The main function of these committees is to prepare People‘s Biodiversity
Register in consultation with local people. Such registers are conceived to
―contain comprehensive information on availability and knowledge of local
biological resources, their medicinal or any other use or any other
traditional knowledge associated with them.‖52
Interestingly, these registers perform the exact same function like
the extant variety register, perhaps with more information. It would be
natural for both of these registers to contain overlapping information –and,
they would both perform the same function of creating a log of existing
48 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers‘ Rights Act, No. 53 of 2001; India
Code (2001) available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=200153.
(Hereinafter, PPVFA). The President of India assented to the PPVFA but the
enactment came into force as of Jan, 2007.
49 Id. §14(b).
50 Id. § 2(j).
51 Biodiversity Rules, 2004 available at nbaindia.org
52 Id. at Rule 22(6).
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materials. Perhaps creating one log that will record the extant varieties,
existing traditional knowledge and biological resources would be a more
efficient idea than having similar data spread over materials several
statutory registers controlled by different authorities.
Similarly, the PPVFA‘s registration regime also recognizes the role
of local farmers and their traditional knowledge. In doing so, the
application requirements under this enactment (which is a sui generis regime
for the protection of innovation in plant breeding) must include a
denomination to the variety and describe (1) the geographical origin of the
material and (2) all information regarding the contribution of the farmer,
community, or organization in the development of the variety.53 Further,
the application must state that all genetic or parental material used to
develop the variety has been lawfully acquired.54
Moreover, section 40 necessitates the breeder to disclose
information ―regarding the use of genetic material conserved by any tribal
or rural families in the breeding or development of such [new]
variety.‖55The information in the application is meant to facilitate benefit
sharing – which is very similar to the system described in the Biodiversity
Act, 2002 – yet, these two mechanisms not been reconciled well. That is,
whether there will be one benefit sharing mechanism into which all of the
recourses generated from the various enactments will flow or whether these
will all function as different benefit sharing systems within the scope of
different bureaucracies set up under different statutes. This issue remains
unclear.
India‘s biggest problem is the depletion of valuable bio-diversity
assets on account of urbanization. Unfortunately, this aspect is completely
left uncovered. Thus, whether conservation efforts should include having
adequate parks and green areas in the city has not been addressed. If so,
that the biodiversity authorities and town planning authorities need to work
together towards sustainable development and conservation is a concept
that seems to be untouched in India. Instead, there is an overly egregious
and misplaced fetish on traditional knowledge protection falling into the
framework of several legislations. That traditional knowledge should be
53 Id. § 18(1)(e).
54 Id. § 18(1)(h).
55 PPVFA, supra noteError! Bookmark not defined., § 40.
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protected appropriately is not denied, but, the mechanism in India is
unfortunately, not well-thought of.
Similarly, depletion of valuable agricultural land to real estate and
buildings is an on-going concern in India. Amidst this, the country also
faces woeful infrastructure making it impossible to ignore the requirements
of building roads. Yet, these efforts have to be balanced with biodiversity
protection as well as sustainable development – a paradigm that the
Biodiversity Act, 2002 unfortunately, does not address. Notably, India also
has an Environment Protection Act, which can also address some of these
issues. Perhaps, the hype and the excitement surrounding the Biodiversity
Act and traditional knowledge Bill has caused India to diminish the role of
the Environment legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION
India‘s interest to protect traditional knowledge, beneficially prevent
undue exploitation of such knowledge while conserving biodiversity and its
related assets is highly commendable. But, the exercise has to be more
thoughtful from the point of view of outcome and objectives that needs to
be achieved. An efficient and integrated system that helps achieve the
objectives of protection, conservation and sustainable development needs
to be a by-product of careful research and not a piece-meal approach.

